Cyrille Edwards Appellant v The State Respondent [ECSC]

JurisdictionDominica
JudgeBISHOP J.A.,Chief Justice
Judgment Date09 February 1987
Judgment citation (vLex)[1987] ECSC J0209-1
Docket NumberCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3 of 1986
CourtCourt of Appeal (Dominica)
Date09 February 1987
[1987] ECSC J0209-1

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

Before:

The Honourable Mr. Justice Robotham—Chief Justice

The Honourable Mr. Justice Bishop

The Honourable Mr. Justice Moe

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3 of 1986

Between:
Cyrille Edwards
Appellant
and
The State
Respondent
Appearances:

Mr. A. Piper and Mr. A. Astaphan for appellant

Mr. D. Christian, D.P.P. for Respondent

BISHOP J.A.
delivered the Judgment of the Court
1

Cyrille Edwards and Edward Corriette were charged with the murder of Francis Bellot on the 16th December, 1984. The former was tried separately in January, 1986; and on the 31st January, 1986, the jury returned a verdict of Guilty.

2

On the 14th February, 1986, a Notice of Appeal against conviction was filed. The only ground of appeal stated was that "the learned trial Judge erred in law in that she failed to direct the jury that an intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm does not negative provocation".

3

On the 15th January, 1987, a Notice of Motion was filed seeking the leave of this Court to file and argue seven additional grounds of appeal. Leave was granted when the matter came on for hearing on the 9th February, 1987, but in the course of his presentation, learned Counsel informed the Court that his arguments and submissions would be limited to a complaint against the directions to the jury on the question of provocation.

4

It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the learned Judge failed to direct the jury adequately or at all on the issue of provocation, and that the directions given had the effect of withdrawing provocation from consideration by the jury.

5

The learned Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that in hersumming up the trial Judge did direct the jury on the issue of provocation and that, in the circumstances of this case, the directions were adequate. He contended that the impact of the summing up must have left the jury with a clear understanding of what they ought to consider when determining whether or not there was provocation on the facts before them.

6

After hearing learned Counsel's submissions fully, this Court, in a unanimous decision quashed the conviction, set aside the verdict of Guilty of Murder, substituted a verdict of Guilty of Manslaughter and imposed a sentence of 10 years imprisonment with hard labour. In addition, it was indicated that the reasons for our decision would be put in writing and given at the next sitting of the Court in this Commonwealth.

7

The reasons are as follows:

8

Francis Bellot died on the afternoon of the 16th December, 1984. Two days later Dr. de Ridder carried out a post mortem examination on the body. His finding that the cause of death was severe brain damage remained unchallenged. When he examined the skull he saw a1/2 centimetre entry hole and a 2 centimetre exit hole, a fracture of the base of the skull and a subdural haematoma on the left. Fragments of bullets were removed. The doctor formed the opinion, which was uncontradicted, that the injuries which he saw could have been the result of penetrating bullets.

9

The case for the State was contained essentially in the accounts of two eye witnesses and in a statement dictated to the police by the appellant on the 17th December, 1984.

10

In their testimony, Anthony Agar and his wife Carmel, said that they were travelling in a pick-up along a road leading from Soufriere Village to Morne Rouge, at about 4.00 p.m. when they saw three young men running—one behind the other—very quickly, on the said road. They then turned off the road into a downward sloping footpath. When the man in front reached a little more than half way along that path, he fell face forward. The second man caught up with the first one, stopped when he reached him, bent over, stretched out his hand and immediately thereafter the sound of a .22 pistol was heard. (The role of the third young man was irrelevant to this appeal). The two young men ran away leaving the other man on the ground.

11

It was the State's case that the young man who fell was Francis Bellot and the second young man was the appellant. The trial was conducted on the basis that it was accepted that the appellant shot Francis Bellot and that Francis Bellot died as a result.

12

The jury was invited to find that the appellant chased Bellot along the main road and down the footpath, and that this chase and the subsequent shooting were deliberate and unprovoked, and that this conduct by the appellant amounted to an attack carried out with the intention of killing Francis Bellot. Further, there was no justification or excuse in law for doing so.

13

That was the State's position based upon the evidence of Anthony and Carmel Agar. However, the description of the incident, as given in the statement dictated under caution, differed strikingly from that related by the eye-witnesses; and that statement from the appellant formed part of the State's case. In our view it was an important aspect, particularly so in the light of the ground of appeal which was argued before us.

14

Cyrille Edwards told the police that he and Edward Corriette had broken and entered a house and stolen a number of things. His companion had taken a gun. Then, while on the way from the house, a rastafarian came out of the bush and accused them of stealing his marijuana. This rastafarian also threateneed that when he was finished with them he would bury them there. Then the statement continued thus:—

"The rastafarian was running behind us with a long knife and we run and run. When we reach a certain place we could not run we were tired. It was bush we were beating. We don't know there. When I see him coming to me with the knife I burst a bullet. He freeze a bit. He pass at back in some bush and he was coming back behind us again. He send a couple big stones from the bush. Only one stone slightly got me on my shoulder. So I spin around and put the gun towards him. My finger touched the trigger slightly and the bullet left. All of a sudden I saw him fell down……I run….."

15

Stripped of all its subtlety the statement showed clearly that the appellant admitted firing two shots, the second of which hit the rastafarian. The main differences from the eye-witness account were (i) that the appellant was not chasing but being chased and (ii) that when the appellant fired the second shot the man was not on the ground but standing or running and in the act of assaulting the appellant. In addition, according to the apellant's version to the police, he was threatened both by word and by act and when a further assault became imminent, he shot the assailant who was armed with a knife.

16

At his trial, the appellant exercised his right to make an unsworn statement from the dock. That represented the extent of his defence, and while there were undoubted similarities to the statement he dictated to the police, there were significant differences. It willassist to refer to the statement from the dock.

17

The appellant said that he and another man were on their way from "white man house" when they were challenged by a "dread" (rastaman) who accused them and shouted at them that they were stealing all his marijuana and goats. He charged at them with a cutlass. The appellant explained that he ran, pursued by the rastaman who was shouting in patois, or "Ba-way"—(translated: stop him!) The appellant said that he was unfamiliar with the area and he ran south, then changed direction and ran north. Threats and shouts from rastafarians continued and he changed direction yet again in an effort to escape from those who were shouting and trying to block him. When he heard the same rastafarian (who had threatened and chased him) shouting to call the others and telling them that he had them—the appellant and his friend—cornered, they could not escape again, in the words of his statement:—

"I send a shot in the air and make a get away ….. I was running. I didn't know where I was running. So when I send the shot, we (me and my partner) run…… I was a bit tired so we stop and take a little rest…… When we heard them coming we start to run again. Unknown to me the direction I was running was towards them. The same dread baree—'ba-way' us again and he shouting at the others come……. I was afraid. I did not want to die because them action and words was sounding like they going to finish with us…… I was panicking. I was worried as I see them coming towards us I saw death in my eye as the one that was closer was coming to me with the cutlass in his hand. I was so afraid that when he charged at me I pulled the gun and shot left. So when shot left then this happen very quick. So I run away……I still hear other rastaman still chasing us. We get away. When I get away I say praise God because they chasing us. I did not want to kill him……. I just want to get out alive……."

18

The appellant was claiming that he was threatened and chased by rastafarians at least one of whom was armed—not with a knife, but with a cutlass. Fear, panic and imminent death made him react. He...

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